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1. Introduction 
 
The Restructuring Directive (hereafter: the 
Directive)1 requires that debtors have access to a 
temporary stay on individual enforcement actions 
(hereafter: stay) to support the negotiations on a 
restructuring plan. The stay should enable the 
debtor to continue operating or at least preserve 
the value of their estate during the negotiations.2 
The stay may cover all types of claims, including 
secured claims and preferential claims.3 Member 
States may provide that the stay is general, 
covering all creditors, or limited, covering one or 
more individual creditors or categories of 
creditors.4 
The Directive does not harmonise all the 
effects of the stay on creditors’ rights and Member 
States must fill in some of the blanks. One of the 
blanks is the (continued) deployment of 
encumbered or third-party owned assets in the 
debtor’s ordinary course of business. Under 
normal (going concern) circumstances, the debtor 
often may use or sell encumbered or third-party 
owned assets free of security rights in the debtor’s 
ordinary course of business. In some jurisdictions, 
this power is conferred by law upon the debtor. In 
other jurisdictions, secured creditors contractually 
waive their right to follow the asset into the hands 
of third parties and thereby enable the debtor to 
generate the income from which he can repay the 
and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (Directive on 
restructuring and insolvency). 
2 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 32. 
3 Art 6 (2). 
4 Art 6 (3). 
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The Restructuring Directive provides for a 
temporary stay on individual enforcement actions 
to support the negotiations on a restructuring 
plan. The stay should enable the debtor to 
continue operating or at least preserve the value 
of their estate during the negotiations. Under 
normal (going concern) circumstances, the debtor 
often may use or sell encumbered or third-party 
owned assets free of security rights in the debtor’s 
ordinary course of business. If (pre-) insolvency 
proceedings are opened and a stay applies, the 
continued use and disposal of encumbered or 
third-party owned assets is not always self-
evident. During the Directive’s stay, secured 
creditors cannot enforce their security rights and 
are at risk of depreciation and value fluctuation of 
the encumbered assets and the time value cost of 
delay. A secured creditor may want to terminate 
the use and disposal if there is uncertainty as to 
whether he will be (re)paid out of the proceeds or 
whether their security right passes into the 
proceeds. The Directive ignores this asset 
deployment problem, since (1) it does not clarify 
whether and to what extent powers under the 
security agreement are affected, and (2) it does 
not require Member States to protect secured 
creditors during the stay. The author illustrates 
how Member States could sensibly deal with the 
deployment of encumbered assets during the stay 
by analysing how a stay affects asset deployment 
in three Member States’ (formal) insolvency 
procedures aimed at restructuring (Austria, 
Belgium and the Netherlands), and by drawing 
inspiration from the UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law. 
 







secured obligation(s). Various legal systems 
across the globe provide that the security right 
automatically passes into the proceeds generated 
by the sale of the encumbered asset.5  
If (pre-)insolvency proceedings are 
opened, the continued use and disposal of 
encumbered or third-party owned assets is not 
always self-evident. A secured creditor may want 
to terminate the use and disposal if there is 
uncertainty as to whether he will be (re)paid out of 
the proceeds or whether their security right passes 
into the proceeds. The secured creditor may prefer 
liquidation of the assets as he knows he has 
priority in the distribution of the proceeds thereof. 
Terminating the right to use and dispose of 
encumbered assets could be in the interest of the 
secured creditor, but could also prevent the debtor 
from continuing their ordinary course of business 
during the pre-insolvency proceedings to the 
detriment of the general body of creditors. The 
notion of article 5 (the debtor remaining in control 
of their assets and day-to-day operation of 
business) could become illusory and make the 
prevention of formal insolvency proceedings and 
liquidation very unlikely.6 
The Directive, however, does not deal 
with this problem directly. It is now up to the 
Member States to provide an adequate solution to 
this problem in the implementation of the 
Directive. In this article, I will show where the 
directive falls short and why Member States need 
to fill this gap.  
Firstly, I will set out how the Directive 
deals with (non-cooperating) secured and 
unsecured creditors during a stay (§2). I will use a 
functional approach to security rights in movables 
by not only discussing limited real rights, such as 
a right of pledge, but also fiduciary security 
ownership (fiducia) and retention of title devices.7 
The assets in which secured creditors have these 
 
5 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, 
para. 73. 
6 If the debtor’s biggest creditors takes these steps, a pre-
insolvency arrangement is probably doomed from the start, as 
they are key counterparties in the negotiation of a 
restructuring plan. 
7 Every Member State should have retention of title devices 
because of the implementation of article 4 of Directive 
2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial 
transactions. 
security interests shall be referred to as 
encumbered assets. Secondly, I will analyse how a 
stay affects (non-cooperating) secured creditors in 
Member States’ (formal) insolvency procedures 
aimed at restructuring (§3). It is likely that, when 
implementing the Directive into national law, 
Member States will draw upon the scope and legal 
effects of the stay that many Member States 
already have in their (formal) insolvency 
procedures regarding restructuring. The focus will 
be on the ways in which secured creditors usually 
allow the debtor to sell encumbered assets free of 
security rights in the ordinary course of business. 
In §4, I will illustrate how Member States could 
sensibly deal with the deployment of encumbered 
assets during the stay by drawing inspiration from 
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
Law. 
 
2. The harmonised effects of the stay  
 
2.1 The stay and secured creditors 
The preamble of the Directive states that pre-
insolvency proceedings should enable debtors in 
financial difficulties to continue business by 
restructuring their assets and liabilities.8 The 
debtor remains in control of their assets and the 
day-to-day operation of their business (debtor-in-
possession) to avoid unnecessary costs, to reflect 
the early nature of preventive restructuring and to 
encourage debtors to apply for preventive 
restructuring at an early stage of their financial 
difficulties.9 Restructuring takes time and a 
temporary stay should support the negotiations on 
a restructuring plan by enabling the debtor to 
continue operating or at least preserve the value of 
their estate during the negotiations.10  
Without a stay, some creditors would 
pursue only their own interest by trying to seize 
individual assets in order to satisfy their claim. 
8 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 2. 
9 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 30. 
10 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 32. Cf. DG 
Baird ‘The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations’ 
(1986) 15 Journal of Legal Studies 133; H Eidenmüller and K 
van Zwieten, Restructuring the European Business 
Enterprise: The EU Commission Recommendation on a New 
Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency (European 
Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper 
No. 301/2015), Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
52/2015, 14. 







This could lead to the piecemeal dismemberment 
of a viable business and destroy both the going 
concern value of the debtor’s business and jobs in 
the process. A collective insolvency procedure is 
often viewed as overcoming a common pool 
problem, where creditors pursue only their own 
interest and over-consume the resource, thus 
depleting it for all.11  
Member States may decide whether the 
stay is granted by a judicial or administrative 
authority or by operation of law. They can provide 
that a stay can be refused in cases where a stay is 
not necessary or where it would not fulfil the 
objective of supporting the negotiations. For 
example, the stay could be refused if there is a lack 
of support by the required majorities of creditors.12  
 
During a stay, a secured creditor is unable to take 
recourse against encumbered assets from the 
debtor. This poses two types of risks for the 
secured creditor. Firstly, there is the risk of 
depreciation and value fluctuation of the 
encumbered assets. Secondly, even if the assets are 
stable in value, the secured creditor bears the time 
value cost of delay.13 He is unable to walk away 
with the value of the encumbered assets to invest 
elsewhere. 
 
The Directive protects secured creditors in several 
ways. Firstly, Member States get to decide 
whether (certain types of) secured creditors are 
excluded from the scope of the stay. The scope of 
the affected creditors by the stay will not be 
harmonised and may be determined by the 
Member States. Member States may provide that a 
stay of individual enforcement actions can be 
general, covering all creditors, or can be limited, 
 
11 TH Jackson, ‘Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An 
Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules’ 
(1986) Am. Bankr. L.J. 402. Cf. RJ de Weijs, ‘Harmonisation 
of European Insolvency Law and the need to tackle two 
common problems: common pool and anticommons’ (2012) 
21 International Insolvency Review (2012) 2, 67-83; N 
Tollenaar, Pre-Insolvency Proceedings: A Normative 
Foundation and Framework (OUP 2019) 2.06. 
12 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 32. Cf. L 
Stanghellini, R Mokal, CG Paulus, I Tirado (eds), Best 
practices in European restructuring. Contractualised distress 
resolution in the shadow of the law (Wolters Kluwer 2018) 
118 (Guideline #5.2 (Projecting cash flows during the stay)); 
H Eidenmüller and K van Zwieten, Restructuring the 
European Business Enterprise: The EU Commission 
Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and 
covering one or more individual creditors or 
categories of creditors (article 6 (3)). Member 
States may exclude certain claims or categories of 
claims from the scope of the stay of individual 
enforcement actions, in well-defined 
circumstances, where such an exclusion is duly 
justified and where (a) enforcement is not likely to 
jeopardise the restructuring of the business or (b) 
the stay would unfairly prejudice the creditors of 
those claims (article 6 (4)). As examples of unfair 
prejudice, the preamble mentions an 
uncompensated loss or depreciation of 
encumbered assets.14 
Secondly, if the stay affects secured 
creditors and they are unfairly prejudiced by it, 
they can seek to lift the stay. Member States 
should provide that the judicial or administrative 
authorities can lift a stay if creditors are unfairly 
prejudiced by it or if it becomes apparent that the 
required majority of creditors does not support the 
continuation of the negotiations.15 Again, the 
preamble relates unfair prejudice to secured 
creditors whose encumbered assets are likely to 
decrease in value during the stay and it remarks 
that the Directive does not contain provisions on 
compensation or guarantees for secured 
creditors.16  
Thirdly, during a stay the debtor is 
supervised by a practitioner in the field of 
restructuring. In general, the appointment of a 
practitioner in the field of restructuring, to 
supervise the activity of a debtor or to partially 
take over control of a debtor’s daily operations is 
not required under the Directive.17 The preamble 
and article 5 imply that the decision to appoint a 
practitioner in the field of restructuring should be 
made on a case-by-case basis depending on the 
Insolvency (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) 
- Law Working Paper No. 301/2015), Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 52/2015, 29. 
13 DG Baird and TH Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and 
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A comment on 
Adequate Protection of secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ 
(1984) 51 University of Chicago Law Review 110. 
14 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 34. 
15 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 36. 
16 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 37. 
Mccormack remarks that the concept of unfair prejudice ‘is 
being asked to do too much and that some of its workload can 
reduced by more particularised guidance.’ G McCormack, 
‘Corporate restructuring law - a second chance for Europe?’ 
(2017) 42 E.L. Rev. 4, 543. 
17 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 30. 







circumstances of the case or on the debtor's 
specific needs. However, the appointment of a 
restructuring trustee is mandatory to safeguard the 
interests of the parties, if a judicial or 
administrative authority grants the debtor a 
general stay.18 
2.2 The continued use and disposal of 
encumbered assets 
The question arises how the stay will affect the 
power/permission usually given to a debtor by a 
secured creditor to sell encumbered assets free of 
security rights in the ordinary course of business. 
The continued use or disposal of encumbered 
assets during the stay is in accordance with the 
most influential justification theory for insolvency 
law, the Creditors’ Bargain Theory. According to 
this theory, developed in the United States in in the 
1980s by the scholars Jackson and Baird, 
insolvency law should reflect the agreements that 
creditors would have made on their position in 
insolvency from an ‘ex ante’ position.19 Creditors 
would probably agree upfront that their actions be 
coordinated and even temporarily suspended to 
preserve the value of assets in the interest of 
creditors and other investors as a whole. 
Substantive (pre-insolvency) creditor’s rights 
should only be changed if this leads to the 
preservation of assets for the collective good of the 
investor group.20 
According to Baird and Jackson, 
‘someone must decide not only how best to deploy 
the assets, but also how to split up the returns from 
those assets. The answer to this second question, 
however, should not affect the determination of 
how to deploy the assets.’21 They added: “As a first 
approximation, therefore, the law governing 
bankruptcy in general, and corporate 
reorganizations in particular, should ensure that 
 
18 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 31. 
19 TH Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, 
and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1982) 91 Yale L.J. 857, DG 
Baird and TH Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the 
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A comment on 
Adequate Protection of secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ 
(1984) 51 University of Chicago Law Review 97, and TH 
Jackson, The logic and limits of bankruptcy law (Harvard UP 
1986). See for an up-to-date overview of the Creditor’s 
Bargain Theory and its influence: N Tollenaar, Pre-
Insolvency Proceedings: A Normative Foundation and 
Framework ( OUP 2019) chapter 2. 
the disposition of the firm's assets is in the interest 
of the owners as a group. How a firm's assets are 
deployed should not turn on whether one, ten, or 
ten thousand people have rights in them. 
Bankruptcy law, accordingly, should aim to keep 
the asset-deployment question separate from the 
distributional question, and to have the 
deployment question answered as a single owner 
would answer it.”22 
A secured creditor would only agree to the 
continued use and disposal of encumbered assets 
if the value of their security interest is properly 
protected. In other words, an infringement on the 
rights of a secured creditor is only justifiable if the 
secured creditor is adequately protected. If the 
value of the encumbered assets is enough to satisfy 
the secured creditor’s claims at the moment 
insolvency proceedings are opened, a secured 
creditor does not necessarily benefit from the 
restructuring. During a stay, the secured creditor’s 
exposure to the debtor could increase because of 
diminution in the value of the encumbered assets. 
A stay also prevents secured creditors from taking 
their money and investing it elsewhere, as they 
would be able to do if the estate was liquidated 
immediately (time value of money). The risks that 
come with a stay should be mitigated by adequate 
protection. The continued use or disposal of 
encumbered assets without adequate protection is 
at odds with the Creditor’s Bargain Theory, as this 
would deprive the secured creditor of the benefit 
of their bargain or (the value of) their security 
rights.  
The question arises to what extent this 
approach is applicable to the pre-insolvency 
procedure of the Restructuring Directive. One can 
look at the agreements that creditors would have 
made on their position during pre-insolvency 
proceedings from an ‘ex ante’ point of view but 
20 DG Baird and TH Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and 
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A comment on 
Adequate Protection of secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ 
(1984) 51 University of Chicago Law Review 100-101. 
21 DG Baird and TH Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and 
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A comment on 
Adequate Protection of secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ 
(1984) 51 University of Chicago Law Review 105. 
22 DG Baird and TH Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and 
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A comment on 
Adequate Protection of secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ 
(1984) 51 University of Chicago Law Review 108.  







the reality is that the alternative to pre-insolvency 
is often formal insolvency proceedings and not a 
legal vacuum. This means that secured creditors 
may have to accept that their position in pre-
insolvency proceedings is not better than in formal 
insolvency proceedings. For example, secured 
creditors who presently lose access to out-of-court 
enforcement of their security rights under national 
formal insolvency procedures will not actually be 
deprived of their bargain if they lose their 
enforcement rights because of the opening of the 
pre-insolvency proceedings. The Directive’s 
preamble states that “in restructuring frameworks 
the rights of all parties involved, including 
workers, should be protected in a balanced 
manner.”23 The Directive’s abovementioned 
provisions on unfair prejudice suggest that saving 
a debtor´s business and jobs should not happen at 
any price and offer some protection to secured 
creditors.24 How much secured creditors may be 
prejudiced by the stay remains unclear, as the 
Directive ignores the asset deployment problem 
during the stay. It lacks express provisions on the 
continued use and disposal of encumbered assets. 
The Directive does, however, contain a set of rules 
regarding executory contracts, which affect asset 
deployment during the stay. 
 
2.3 How the provisions on executory contracts 
affect asset deployment 
The Directive prevents creditors from withholding 
performance or terminating, accelerating or, in any 
other way, modifying essential executory 
contracts to the detriment of the debtor, for debts 
that came into existence prior to the stay, solely by 
virtue of the fact that they were not paid by the 
debtor.25 The preamble states: 
Early termination can endanger the 
ability of a business to continue operating 
during restructuring negotiations, 
especially when contracts for essential 
supplies such as gas, electricity, water, 
telecommunication and card payment 
services are concerned. Member States 
 
23 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 3. 
24 See on the justification of pre-insolvency proceedings: N 
Tollenaar, Pre-Insolvency Proceedings: A Normative 
Foundation and Framework (OUP 2019) chapter 3. 
25 Article 7 (4) 
should provide that creditors to which a 
stay of individual enforcement actions 
applies, and whose claims came into 
existence prior to the stay and have not 
been paid by a debtor, are not allowed to 
withhold performance of, terminate, 
accelerate or, in any other way, modify 
essential executory contracts during the 
stay period, provided that the debtor 
complies with its obligations under such 
contracts which fall due during the stay. 
Executory contracts are, for example, 
lease and licence agreements, longterm 
supply contracts and franchise 
agreements.26 
In other words, the creditor is barred from 
terminating the contract when their debtor is in 
default and opens a pre-insolvency procedure. The 
creditor remains bound to the contract as long as 
the debtor complies with its obligations under the 
executory contract which fall due during the stay.27 
The Directive’s provisions on executory contracts 
apply to essential executory contracts but Member 
States may also provide that the stay applies to 
non-essential executory contracts. The second 
sentence of article 7 (4) of the Directive states: 
“Essential executory contracts’ shall be 
understood to mean executory contracts which are 
necessary for the continuation of the day-to-day 
operations of the business, including contracts 
concerning supplies, the suspension of which 
would lead to the debtor's activities coming to a 
standstill.” According to the preamble, this will 
include contracts for essential supplies such as gas, 
electricity, water, telecommunication and card 
payment services are concerned.28 The limitation 
to essential executory causes uncertainty, as the 
specific circumstances of the case decide which 
contracts are essential.29 Stanghellini, Mokal, 
Paulus & Tirado remark that dealing with these 
contracts is a thorny issue, as “‘critical vendors’, 
i.e. suppliers and counterparties of the debtor that 
will not perform their obligations unless they are 
26 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 41. 
27 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 41. 
28 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 41. 
29 Cf. G G McCormack, ‘Corporate restructuring law - a 
second chance for Europe?’ (2017) 42 E.L. Rev. 4, 559. 







paid also for the pre-existing debts.”30 If Member 
States exclude non-essential executory contracts 
from the stay, these creditors will be able to 
withhold performance, terminate, accelerate or, in 
any other way, modify an executory contract if the 
debtor is in default. 
The Directive aims to prevent creditors from 
evading the restrictions of the stay by terminating 
executory contracts just before or at the moment 
of the opening of the pre-insolvency procedure. 
Article 7 (5) nullifies the effects of so-called ipso 
facto-clauses during and prior to the pre-
insolvency procedure. The occurrence of events 
specified in the contract (e.g., acceleration clauses) 
usually trigger a debtor’s default. This default 
enables the creditor to withhold performance, 
terminate, accelerate or, in any other way, modify 
an executory contract if a specific event occurs. 
The Directive nullifies (the effects of) clauses 
providing for such measures, solely by reason of: 
(a) a request for the opening of 
preventive restructuring proceedings;  
(b) a request for a stay of individual 
enforcement actions; 
(c) the opening of preventive 
restructuring proceedings; or  
(d) the granting of a stay of individual 
enforcement actions as such.  
Article 2 (1) (5) defines an ‘executory contract’ as 
a contract between a debtor and one or more 
creditors under which the parties still have 
obligations to perform at the time the stay of 
 
30 L L Stanghellini, R Mokal, CG Paulus, I Tirado (eds), Best 
practices in European restructuring. Contractualised distress 
resolution in the shadow of the law (Wolters Kluwer 2018) 
100 fn. 23. 
31 The Directive’s approach to executory contract strongly 
resembles Section 365 of the US Bankruptcy Code on 
executory contracts. The Code does not define executory 
contracts but leaves it to the courts to identify executory 
contracts. The courts have adopted various ways to test the 
executory character of a contract. An often applied test is the 
so-called Countryman-test. The American scholar 
Countryman argued that an executory contract is “a contract 
under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other 
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of 
either to complete performance would constitute a material 
breach excusing the performance of the other.” See: V 
Countryman, ‘Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part I’ 
(1973) 57 Minn. Law Review 439. Some courts use the 
individual enforcement actions is granted or 
applied.31 This broad definition of executory 
contracts will be new to some European countries, 
as various legal systems presently have specific 
rules relating to different types of executory 
contracts in insolvency.32 The Directive does not 
clarify how significant the obligations’ 
performance must be for a contract to be 
considered executory. Any remaining 
performance seems to be sufficient.  For example, 
lease and supply contracts could fall under the 
scope. A contract of sale without the sold goods 
having been delivered is executory. A contract of 
sale with the sold goods having been delivered 
could be executory if the creditor is still required 
to transfer ownership after payment of the 
purchase price (retention of title). A loan 
agreement can be executory, if the lender extended 
a revolving credit facility to their debtor and the 
debtor has not withdrawn funds up to the pre-
approved credit limit. A term loan agreement is no 
longer executory once the creditor has provided 
the loan amount to the debtor.33 
Unsecured creditors are often deprived of their 
options if they cannot terminate, accelerate or, in 
any other way, modify the agreement. Secured 
creditors, however, still have other options, even if 
they remain bound to the executory contract and 
are prevented from enforcing their security rights 
by the stay. A debtor’s default on its secured 
obligations prior to the stay is not without 
consequence, since it triggers various provisions 
in the security agreement. 
The Directive’s stay only prevents secured 
creditors from enforcing their security rights. A 
functional test which works ‘backward from an examination 
of the purposes to be accomplished by rejection, and if they 
have already been accomplished then the contract cannot be 
executory’ See: In re Magness, 972 F.2d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 
1992); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘A Functional Analysis of 
Executory Contracts’, (1989) 74 Minn. L. Rev. 227. Cf. J 
Chuah, ‘A thematic and comparative critique’ in J Chuah and 
E Vaccari (eds), Executory contracts in insolvency law (Elgar 
Publishing 2019) 1.10-1.12. 
32 J Chuah, ‘A thematic and comparative critique’ in J Chuah 
and E Vaccari (eds), Executory contracts in insolvency law 
(Elgar Publishing 2019) 1.10-1.14. 
33 Cf. US case law, such as In Re Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v 
Security Pacific National Trust C, 104 B.R. 
667 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) where it was held that a loan 
transaction is not an executory contract if the only 
performance that remains is the debtor's present or future duty 
to repay the loan. 







security agreement usually contains more than just 
clauses on the (out-of-court) enforcement of the 
security rights. It mostly contains obligations for 
the debtor but also some for the secured creditor. 
For example, the debtor is often required to insure 
the encumbered assets and offer substitute security 
if the original encumbered assets perish. The 
creditor is sometimes required to release excess 
security. The security agreement also contains 
clauses that grant powers to the debtor or creditor, 
such as the power/permission to dispose of 
encumbered assets free of security rights in the 
debtor’s ordinary course of business. This is often 
accompanied by provisions on 
termination/revocation of the power/permission. 
For example, the secured creditor is free to revoke 
the permission at any time, under special 
circumstances, or the debtor’s power is 
automatically terminated from the moment the 
debtor is in default.  
The impact of the Directive on secured creditors’ 
contractual powers (and obligations) under the 
security agreement is unclear, since the Directive 
does not clarify how the security agreement relates 
to the provisions on executory contracts. This 
raises – at least – three questions. Firstly, do the 
Directive’s provisions on executory contracts 
apply to the security agreement itself? In most 
cases, a secured creditor would have no 
obligations to perform under the security 
agreement at the moment pre-insolvency 
proceedings are opened. This would make the 
security agreement not executory.34 If the secured 
creditor would still have obligations to perform 
under the contract at that moment, for example 
releasing excess security, the security agreement 
could be considered executory. Secondly, what 
happens if the security agreement is not executory 
but the contract from which the secured claim 
ensues, is? The Directive’s characterisation of the 
underlying contract as an executory contract does 
not necessarily include the security agreement. 
This means that Member States can treat the 
underlying agreement and security agreement 
jointly or separately. The joint treatment would 
mean that a secured creditor that is bound to an 
 
34 Cf. US case law on the non-executory character of a 
security agreement: Jenson v. Cont’l Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 
482 (8th Cir. 1979). 
executory contract cannot terminate, accelerate or, 
in any other way, modify the security agreement, 
solely by reason of (a) a request for the opening of 
preventive restructuring proceedings, (b) a request 
for a stay of individual enforcement actions, (c) the 
opening of preventive restructuring proceedings, 
or (d) the granting of a stay of individual 
enforcement actions as such. Thirdly, even if the 
security agreement itself is executory or it is 
treated jointly with a secured executory contract, 
to what extent does this qualification affect the 
secured creditor’s powers under the security 
agreement? The Directive only prevents creditors 
from terminating, accelerating or, in any other 
way, modifying the contract. It does not clarify 
whether exercising contractual powers is a 
modification of the contract. 
Member States will need to provide answers to 
these questions, because the present unclarity 
could make restructuring efforts less effective and 
have an impact on ex-ante risk assessment and the 
availability of credit. Without answers, some 
secured creditors will be able to prevent the debtor 
from disposing of encumbered assets in the 
debtor’s ordinary course of business (and other 
creditors will not). There could be roughly three 
categories of secured creditors. The first category 
consists of secured creditors that are not affected 
by the provisions on executory contracts, such as 
most of the secured lenders. These secured 
creditors are still able to exercise their powers 
under the security agreement. This means that they 
can terminate/revoke the power/permission to 
dispose of encumbered assets free of security 
rights in the debtor’s ordinary course of business, 
if it is in the interest of the secured creditor. 
Consequently, the debtor is prevented from 
deploying the assets. The second category consists 
of secured creditors that remain bound to an 
executory contract but are still able to exercise 
their powers under the security agreement, 
because the security agreement is not executory. 
This category could include suppliers that have a 
right of (non-possessory) pledge in the delivered 
assets. As in the first category, these secured 
creditors can effectively prevent the debtor from 
 







disposing of the assets. The third category consists 
of secured creditors that are prevented from 
exercising their rights under the security 
agreement, because it is treated as an executory 
contract. The debtor can still dispose of the assets 
in the debtor’s ordinary course of business.  
2.4 Ways to prevent asset deployment 
The Directive ignores asset deployment by letting 
some secured creditors (the first and second 
category) prevent the debtor from using or 
disposing of encumbered assets in the ordinary 
course of business, even if this means that the 
debtor is unable to continue their ordinary course 
of business during the pre-insolvency procedure. 
This contrasts sharply to the abovementioned 
Creditor’s Bargain Theory that implies that how 
the debtor’s ‘assets are deployed should not turn 
on whether one, ten, or ten thousand people have 
rights in them.’35 The idea is that the continued 
deployment of assets can be in the interest of the 
creditors and other investors as a whole. The 
debtor needs to be able to continue its business to 
make restructuring feasible. 
Secured creditors will (probably) not 
terminate/revoke the power/permission to dispose 
of encumbered assets free of security rights in the 
debtor’s ordinary course of business if their 
interests are adequately protected during the stay. 
For example, many legal systems across Europe 
provide that the security right automatically passes 
into the proceeds.36 In some Member States, 
however, the proceeds are unencumbered and 
creditors require the creation of a new security 
interest in the proceeds, the direct payment or 
payment into the debtor’s current account to 
enable set-off. Some creditors get no replacement 
security. If secured creditors’ interests are not 
properly protected during the Directive’s stay, 
 
35 DG Baird and TH Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and 
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A comment on 
Adequate Protection of secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ 
(1984) 51 University of Chicago Law Review 108. 
36 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, 
para. 73. 
37 Cf. RJ de Weijs, ‘Harmonisation of European Insolvency 
Law and the need to tackle two common problems: common 
pool and anticommons’ (2012) 21 International Insolvency 
Review (2012) 2, 67-83; N Tollenaar, Pre-Insolvency 
Proceedings: A Normative Foundation and Framework (OUP 
2019) 2.16. 
they can seek to lift the stay, prevent the continued 
disposal of encumbered assets or they can demand 
protection, for example by demanding 
(immediate) payment or replacement security. 
This will give some secured creditors a holdout 
position which could endanger the restructuring 
efforts.37 
The risk that one or several secured creditor(s) will 
effectively prevent the debtor from continuing the 
debtor’s business during the stay is not just 
hypothetical. The Directive itself increases the risk 
that secured creditors may desire to do so, as it 
does not require Member States to protect secured 
creditors during the stay. This means that the 
secured creditor may bear the risk of depreciation 
and value fluctuation of the encumbered assets and 
the time value cost of delay.38 Secured creditors 
will want these risks to be mitigated by adequate 
protection and they wish not to be deprived of the 
benefit of their bargain or (the value of) their 
security rights.39 This is particularly the case 
where secured creditors are worse off during the 
pre-insolvency proceedings than during formal 
insolvency procedures. Secured creditors will 
argue that saving a debtor´s business and jobs 
should not happen at any price, and certainly not 
at the expense of secured creditors. The Directive, 
however, makes protection against these risks 
optional by providing that “Member States may 
afford creditors who are bound to essential 
executory contracts appropriate safeguards with a 
view to preventing unfair prejudice being caused 
to such creditors”.40 If no appropriate safeguards 
are offered in national laws, secured creditors will 
do what it takes to safeguard their interests. They 
could seek to lift the stay and/or try to terminate 
38 DG Baird and TH Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and 
the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A comment on 
Adequate Protection of secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ 
(1984) 51 University of Chicago Law Review 110. 
39 Conversely, shareholders and unsecured creditors 
potentially have much to gain from restructuring, as 
immediate liquidation leaves them with virtually nothing. Cf. 
TH Jackson, ‘Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An 
Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules’ 
(1986) 60 Am. Bankr. L.J. 411-412. 
40 Art 7 (4). 







the continued use and disposal of encumbered 
assets.41  
It is clear that there is nothing new under the sun, 
as similar problems often occur in Member States’ 
current formal insolvency procedures. If secured 
creditors lose access to out-of-court enforcement 
of their security rights under national formal 
insolvency procedures they can also be 
incentivized to exercise their rights prior to 
insolvency. If secured creditors believe their 
interests are served better by liquidation than 
restructuring, they will not support the 
restructuring efforts. Member States are free to 
address these problems as they see fit in their 
national insolvency legislation, regardless of 
whether or not effective restructuring can be 
achieved. However, when it comes to addressing 
this asset deployment problem in the pre-
insolvency procedure, Member States are required 
to put in place preventive restructuring procedures 
which comply with certain minimum principles of 
effectiveness.42 This means that if asset 
deployment is problematic for restructuring efforts 
in Member States’ present formal insolvency 
procedures Member States could be required to 
provide a more effective solution to this problem 
in a pre-insolvency procedure. 
 
3. A comparative analysis of the stay in 
formal insolvency procedures 
How will Member States deal with asset 
deployment during the stay and the protection of 
secured creditors? And how likely are secured 
creditors going to be affected by the provisions on 
executory contracts after implementation of the 
Directive? To answer these questions, I have 
analysed how a stay affects the rights of secured 
creditors in encumbered assets in some Member 
States’ (formal) insolvency procedures aimed at 
restructuring. I selected Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands as relevant jurisdictions for this 
comparative analysis as these three countries have 
 
41 Even if Member States consider the security agreement 
‘executory’ they may still choose not to apply the stay to 
security agreements if they consider such contract to be non-
essential. 
42 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 1 and 13. 
43 § 451 (1) ABGB; ECLI:AT:OGH0002:1954:RS0010394. 
relatively new or upcoming legislation on pre-
insolvency procedures and have different 
approaches to the continued disposal of 
encumbered assets during a stay. Austria is on one 
end of the spectrum as it allows for the continued 
disposal of encumbered assets during a stay. The 
Netherlands is on the other end of the spectrum as 
the continued disposal of encumbered assets 
during a stay is left to the discretion of the secured 
creditors. For each selected country, I will first 
introduce the types of security rights in movables. 
Secondly, I will discuss the effects of the stay on 
secured creditors in general and subsequently on 
secured creditors with executory contracts. 
3.1. Austria 
3.1.1. An introduction to security rights in 
movables 
Austria recognises both pledge (Pfandrecht) and 
title transfer (Sicherungsübereignung) as security 
rights in movables. Both security rights require the 
debtor to transfer control over the movables to the 
creditor.43 Movables which are not easily moved, 
such as big industrial machines, may be labelled to 
show that they are pledged or transferred. In such 
case the transfer of control is not required. Secured 
creditors usually give the debtor permission to sell 
the assets free of security rights in the debtor’s 
ordinary course of business.44 If the debtor 
defaults, the secured creditor can sell the 
encumbered (or transferred) assets and use the 
proceeds to satisfy their secured claim.45 
Suppliers of movables may stipulate a 
retention of title clause (Eigentumsvorbehalt). 
Suppliers usually give the debtor permission to sell 
the assets free of security rights in the debtor’s 
ordinary course of business.46 The supplier retains 
ownership of the delivered movables as long as the 
price is not paid in full. If the debtor defaults, the 
supplier may recover the delivered movables.  
3.1.2. Secured creditors are restrained and 
protected during the stay 
44 ECLI:AT:OGH0002:2014:0060OB00208.13A.1009.000. 
45 § 466a ABGB for pledge. Cf 
ECLI:AT:OGH0002:1980:RS0000832 for title transfer. 
46 ECLI:AT:OGH0002:2014:0060OB00208.13A.1009.000. 







Since 2010, Austria has a new Insolvency statute, 
the Insolvenzordnung (IO). The new statute is a 
joinder of the rules regarding restructuring 
(Sanierungsverfahren) and liquidation 
(Konkursverfahren).47 The restructuring 
procedure principally leaves the debtor in control 
of their assets and day-to-day operation of 
business.48 The debtor is supervised by a trustee in 
restructuring (Sanierungsverwalter).  
The opening of the procedure entails a stay 
of six months for secured creditors.49 The debtor 
may transfer unencumbered assets in their 
ordinary course of business without the trustee’s 
permission.50 However, if assets are pledged or 
fiduciarily transferred in ownership to a creditor, 
only the trustee may sell the assets.51 The trustee 
requires judicial leave (from the court, referred to 
as the Insolvenzgericht) to sell encumbered assets 
at a public auction.52 The trustee must notify the 
secured creditors if he wants to sell privately. The 
secured creditors can object to the private sale by 
making it plausible that a public sale would lead to 
higher proceeds.53  
The proceeds of the sale will not be 
available to the debtor. Secured creditors are 
referred to as  Absonderungsgläubiger.54 This 
means that they have a right of preference over the 
proceeds of the sale of the assets.55 This applies to 
both creditors with rights of pledge and creditors 
with fiduciary ownership.56  
 
 
47 § 1 IO. Cf F Mohr and S Riel, ‘Das IRÄG 2010 aus 
Bankensicht’ (2010) 639 RdW 10, 615. 
48 § 169 IO. 
49 § 11 IO. This applies also to suppliers who stipulated 
retention of title clauses. If they are not paid by the trustee, 
they are Aussonderungsgläubiger and can recover the assets. 
50 § 171 IO. Secured creditors that have control over the assets 
may still sell pursuant to the normal execution rules at a public 
auction. § 120 (3) IO. M Dellinger, P Oberhammer and C 
Koller, Insolvenzrecht: Eine Einführung (Manz 2014) nr 215-
7. 
51 § 172 IO. 
52 § 119, 120 and 172 IO. 
53 § 120 (2) IO. Cf M Roth and H Duursma-Kepplinger, 
Exekutions- und Insolvenzrecht (2016) 235. 
54 § 11 (1) IO. 
55 § 48 IO. Cf M Dellinger, P Oberhammer and C Koller, 
Insolvenzrecht: Eine Einführung (Manz 2014) nr 212; Roth 
and Duursma-Kepplinger (n 31) 233. 
56 § 10 (3) IO. Cf M Roth and H Duursma-Kepplinger, 
Exekutions- und Insolvenzrecht (2016) 234. 
57 For Germany, see C Paulus and M Berberich, ‘National 
Report for Germany, in D Faber, N Vermunt, J Kilborn and K 
3.1.3. How the provisions on executory contracts 
affect retention of title devices 
Creditors who have retention of title devices, often 
suppliers, are affected by the Austrian provisions 
on executory contracts. The contract of sale with a 
retention of title is an executory contract in the 
sense of article 21 IO, since ownership is yet to 
pass.57 
The Austrian provisions on executory 
contracts strongly resemble the Directive’s 
provisions and are influenced by the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005) and 
the US Bankruptcy Code with regard to executory 
contracts.58 The opening of a restructuring 
procedure will not automatically terminate 
executory contracts.59 If the termination of an 
executory contract would jeopardise the 
continuation of the insolvent debtor’s business, the 
creditor cannot terminate the contract on the basis 
of a lack of timely performance by the debtor prior 
to the opening of the insolvency procedure.60 Ipso 
facto clauses that automatically terminate the 
contract because of the opening of an insolvency 
procedure are prohibited.61 As is the case in the 
Directive, the Austrian code does not nullify 
clauses that terminate the contract because of 
events linked to the opening of an insolvency 
procedure.62  
 
If a creditor stipulated a retention of title clause 
and permitted the debtor to sell the assets free of 
van der Linde, Treatment of Contracts in Insolvency (Oxford 
International and Comparative Insolvency Law Series 2013) 
9.43. 
58 F Kernbichler, ‘National Report for Austria’ in J Chuah and 
E Vaccari (eds), Executory contracts in insolvency law (Elgar 
Publishing 2019) 4.13. 
59 § 25a IO. See on executory contracts in Austria in general: 
F Kernbichler, ‘National Report for Austria’ in J Chuah and 
E Vaccari (eds), Executory contracts in insolvency law (Elgar 
Publishing 2019) 4.13. 
60 § 25a IO. Kernbichler argues against this restriction by 
illustrating that it is relatively easy for a creditor to argue that 
the termination of just one contract will not threaten the 
continuation of the debtor’s business. If all creditors use this 
argument, however, the continuation will be jeopardised  See: 
F Kernbichler, ‘National Report for Austria’ in J Chuah and 
E Vaccari (eds), Executory contracts in insolvency law (Elgar 
Publishing 2019) 4.18-4.19. 
61 § 25b IO. 
62 F Kernbichler, ‘National Report for Austria’ in J Chuah and 
E Vaccari (eds), Executory contracts in insolvency law (Elgar 
Publishing 2019) 4.30-4.31. Cf. Article 7 (5) of the Directive. 







security rights in the debtor’s ordinary course of 
business prior to the opening of the insolvency 
procedure, the permission is not automatically 
withdrawn by the opening of the procedure.63 The 
seller must ask whether the debtor/trustee chooses 
to continue or reject the contract.64 If the 
debtor/trustee opts for the non-performance of the 
underlying contract, the debtor may no longer use 
or sell the assets. The creditor will become an 
Aussonderungsgläubiger and will have the right to 
retrieve the assets, once the stay is over.  
The debtor’s/trustee’s choice to continue 
the contract prevents the seller from terminating 
the contract on the basis of a lack of timely 
performance by the debtor prior to the opening of 
the insolvency procedure.65 The supplier cannot 
revoke the permission to sell the assets free of 
security rights in the debtor’s ordinary course of 
business if this jeopardises the continuation of the 
debtor’s business. The debtor is able to determine 
how best to deploy the assets. Although the debtor 
has to comply with its obligations under the 
executory contract which fall due during the stay, 
he does not have to cure past breaches (prior to the 
opening of the pre-insolvency procedure).66 This 
means the creditor will not be paid for deliveries 
prior to the opening of the procedure and the 
‘collateral’ can vanish as the debtor/trustee 
disposes of the property. The creditor may only 
terminate the contract if its continuation leads to 
severe personal or economic damages for the 
creditor. It is left to legal practice to determine 




3.2.1. An introduction to security rights in 
movables 
On the first of January 2018, the new Belgian 
Pledge Act came into force. The main innovation 
 
63 ECLI:AT:OGH0002:2014:0060OB00208.13A.1009.000. 
64 § 21 IO. 
65 § 25a IO. 
66 The Austrian legislature did not follow the UNCITRAL 
legislative guide on insolvency recommendation 79. 
67 According to Kernbichler, severe personal or economic 
damages are not easily accepted. See: F Kernbichler, 
‘National Report for Austria’ in J Chuah and E Vaccari (eds), 
Executory contracts in insolvency law (Elgar Publishing 
2019) 4.25. 
of the Pledge Act is the introduction of a central 
register, enabling a debtor to create a right of 
pledge in their movable assets without having to 
hand over control over the assets to their creditor, 
as the old Belgium provisions only recognised 
possessory pledge. A right of pledge is perfected 
by registration in a newly created Pledge Register. 
Parties can also still opt for possessory pledges. If 
the debtor defaults, the secured creditor can have 
the encumbered assets sold and use the proceeds 
to satisfy their secured claim.68 Article 21 of the 
Pledge Act provides that a debtor may dispose of 
encumbered assets free of rights of pledge in their 
ordinary course of business, unless the parties 
agreed otherwise.69 The creditor’s security right 
will automatically extend to the receivable that 
replaces the asset if it has been sold (zakelijke 
subrogatie).70  
Article 69 of the Pledge Act provides a 
legal basis for a creditor who has stipulated a 
retention of title clause (eigendomsvoorbehoud). 
The creditor has the right to recover its goods if the 
buyer fails to pay the price in full. Creditors 
usually give the debtor permission to sell the assets 
free of security rights in their ordinary course of 
business. The creditor’s security right will extend 
to the receivable that replaces the asset if it has 
been sold (zakelijke subrogatie).71  
3.2.2. Secured creditors can prevent asset 
deployment during the stay despite protection 
Belgium has two formal insolvency procedures: 
the judicial reorganisation (gerechtelijke 
reorganisatie) and bankruptcy (faillissement). The 
judicial reorganisation offers the debtor the 
opportunity to sort things out when its business 
continuity is at immediate or foreseeable risk. One 
of the options is that the debtor prepares a 
composition to offer to its creditors. The debtor 
68 Art 47 Pandwet (or Book III, title XVII of the Belgian Civil 
Code). The secured creditor and debtor can also agree on a 
forfeiture clause at the time of the conclusion of the pledge 
contract or afterwards, even after the debtor has defaulted. Cf 
Art 53 Pandwet (or Book III, title XVII of the Belgian Civil 
Code). 
69 J. Baeck, Voorrechten en hypotheken OVH, Commentaar 
bij Art 21 Pandwet, 56 (23 September 2015) 39. 
70 Art 9 Pandwet. 
71 Art 70 and 9 Pandwet. 







remains in possession of the business but is under 
judicial supervision.72  
Secured creditors cannot enforce their 
rights in rem from the moment a petition for 
judicial reorganisation is filed.73 The stay remains 
in place when the judge opens the judicial 
reorganisation for a period of maximum 6 
months.74 Secured creditors do not lose their 
rights, but are only restricted during a stay period. 
If encumbered assets are sold by the debtor during 
the stay with or without the creditor’s permission, 
the creditor’s security right will extend to the 
receivable that replaces the asset (zakelijke 
subrogatie).75 During the stay, creditors may 
revoke the permission given to the debtor to sell 
the assets free of security rights in their ordinary 
course of business.76  
Art. XX.56 (2) of the Belgian Code of 
Economic Law (Wetboek Economisch Recht) 
confirms that the stay does not impact the 
executory contracts (lopende overeenkomsten), as 
a rule these contracts should be executed.77 A 
creditor may not terminate or modify a contract for 
debts that came into existence prior to the stay, 
solely by reason of the fact that they were not paid 
by the debtor. However, the creditor may 
terminate the contract fifteen days after serving 
notice to the debtor and thus offering the debtor a 
chance to fulfil its obligations. This means that the 
debtor is required to cure past breaches of the 
contract (prior to the insolvency procedure). 
Article XX.56 (1) WER nullifies the effects of so-
called ipso facto-clauses terminating the contract 
if a reorganisation is requested or opened. The 
Belgian provisions on executory contracts, 
however, do not expressly mention the security 
agreement.78 This means that the question whether 
a security agreement should be considered as an 
executory contract will be determined in light of 
the facts of the case. It could therefore be relevant 
 
72 Art XX.39 WER. 
73 Art XX.44 WER.  
74 Art 46, § 2 WER. The debtor can request to extend the 
duration of the stay up to 12 or 18 months, see art. XX.59 
WER 
75 Once the money is paid by the third party-buyer to the 
debtor who sold the asset, however, the secured creditor loses 
his security. The security right will exist as long as the 
‘proceeds’ are identifiable in the estate of the debtor. 
76 Cf. J. Baeck, Voorrechten en hypotheken OVH, 
Commentaar bij Art 21 Pandwet, 56 (23 September 2015) 39. 
whether the security agreement is a separate 
agreement or whether it is incorporated in an 
executory contract (e.g., sales contract) that is 
affected by the stay. Unlike in Austria, however, a 
sale with a retention of title is not necessarily an 
executory contract solely on the basis ownership is 
yet to pass. In short, security agreements that are 
not affected by the provisions on executory 
contracts can effectively prevent asset deployment 
during a stay. 
 
3.3. The Netherlands 
3.3.1. An introduction to security rights in 
movables 
The Dutch civil code of 1992 (Burgerlijk Wetboek; 
BW) enables a debtor to create a right of pledge in 
its movable assets without having to hand over 
control over the assets to the creditor (vuistloos or 
stil pandrecht). This right of non-possessory 
pledge is created by the drawing up of a notarised 
deed of pledge or the (non-public) registration of a 
deed of pledge with the Dutch tax authorities.79 
The Dutch civil code also recognises possessory 
pledge (vuistpandrecht), which requires a transfer 
of control.80 Secured creditors usually give the 
debtor permission to sell the assets free of security 
rights in the debtor’s ordinary course of business. 
A creditor’s security right will, however, not 
automatically extend to the receivable that 
replaces the asset if it has been sold by the debtor, 
as it does in Belgium. The parties often create a 
new right of pledge in the receivables. If the debtor 
defaults, a secured creditor can have the 
encumbered assets sold and use the proceeds to 
satisfy its secured claim.81  
Suppliers of movables may stipulate a 
retention of title clause (Eigendomsvoorbehoud).82 
Suppliers usually give the debtor permission to sell 
77 Cf. E Dirix and R Fransis, ‘National Report for Belgium’ 
in D Faber, N Vermunt, J Kilborn and K van der Linde, 
Treatment of Contracts in Insolvency (Oxford International 
and Comparative Insolvency Law Series 2013) 29-47. 
78 Cf. E Dirix and R Fransis, ‘National Report for Belgium’ 
in D Faber, N Vermunt, J Kilborn and K van der Linde, 
Treatment of Contracts in Insolvency (Oxford International 
and Comparative Insolvency Law Series 2013) 2.64-2.71. 
79 Art 3:237 (1) BW. 
80 Art 3:236 (1) BW. 
81 Art 3:248 (1) BW 
82 Art 3:92 (1) BW. 







the assets free of security rights in their ordinary 
course of business. The supplier retains ownership 
of the delivered movables as long as the price is 
not paid in full. If the debtor defaults, the supplier 
may recover the delivered movables.  
3.3.2. Restructuring and the effects of the stay for 
secured creditors in general 
On 6 October 2020, the Dutch Senate (Eerste 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal) adopted a bill of an 
act regarding the introduction of a pre-insolvency 
procedure in the Netherlands, the so-called Act on 
the Confirmation of Private Plans (Wet 
Homologatie Onderhands Akkoord, hereafter: 
WHOA).83 It intends to reinforce the out-of-court 
debt rescheduling and restructuring process of 
businesses that, although they are over-indebted 
and at risk of insolvency, still have viable 
activities. The act combines elements of the UK 
scheme with elements of US Chapter 11 and is 
strongly connected to the implementation of the 
Restructuring Directive. 
The WHOA enables the debtor to request that the 
court orders a stay in respect of all of its creditors 
or any number of them.84 Creditors who are 
affected by the stay may not enforce their rights 
against assets belonging to the debtor’s estate or 
require the repossession of assets from the debtor 
without leave from the court. A temporary stay 
should support the negotiations on a restructuring 
plan. A creditor may not terminate a contract for 
debts that came into existence prior to the stay, 
solely by virtue of the fact that they were not paid 
by the debtor.85 The effects of ipso facto clauses 
are nullified, as article 373 (3) provides that the 
proposal of a plan is not justification for changing 
commitments and obligations to the debtor, for 
suspending performance of an obligation to the 
 
83 For the treatment of executory contracts in insolvency, see 
D Faber and N Vermunt, ‘National Report for the 
Netherlands’ in D Faber, N Vermunt, J Kilborn and K van der 
Linde, Treatment of Contracts in Insolvency (Oxford 
International and Comparative Insolvency Law Series 2013) 
287-330. 
84 Article 376 (1) WHOA. See for an elaborate analysis of the 
WHOA’s stay: FMJ Verstijlen, ‘Flankerende voorzieningen 
in de Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord ter voorkoming 
van faillissement’ in Het dwangakkoord buiten faillissement - 
Beschouwingen over het Voorontwerp Wet homologatie 
onderhands akkoord ter voorkoming van faillissement 
(Preadvies van de Vereeniging 'Handelsrecht' 2017) 99-116. 
debtor or for terminating an agreement concluded 
with the debtor  
To prevent misuse of the instrument by the debtor, 
the WHOA provides that the court may grant a 
request for a stay only where there is prima facie 
evidence that: 
- it is necessary to enable the debtor’s 
business to continue during the 
preparations for and negotiations on the 
plan; 
- it is in the interest of the general body of 
creditors; and 
- it could reasonably be assumed at the 
time of ordering a stay that it would not 
materially prejudice the interests of any 
creditors affected by the stay.86 
Where the court decides to order a stay, it may 
make all provisions it deems necessary to secure 
the interests of the creditors or shareholders.87 The 
court can appoint an observer to monitor the 
preparation process and will probably do so if it 
orders a general stay.88 The court can also appoint 
a restructuring expert to take over the preparations 
for a plan.89  
3.3.3. The continued disposal of encumbered 
assets and adequate protection 
If the debtor had the right to use, expend or dispose 
of encumbered assets before the stay, article 377 
provides that the debtor keeps this right during the 
stay, insofar as it is necessary for the debtor’s 
ordinary course of business:  
Article 377 Continued use of encumbered 
property in the ordinary course of business  
85 Article 373 (4) WHOA. Cf. FMJ Verstijlen, ‘Flankerende 
voorzieningen in de Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord ter 
voorkoming van faillissement’ in Het dwangakkoord buiten 
faillissement - Beschouwingen over het Voorontwerp Wet 
homologatie onderhands akkoord ter voorkoming van 
faillissement (Preadvies van de Vereeniging 'Handelsrecht' 
2017) 113-115. 
86 Article 376 (4) WHOA. 
87 Article 376 (9) WHOA. 
88 Article 380 (1) WHOA. 
89 Article 380 (2) WHOA. 







1. A debtor who had the right to use, expend or 
dispose of property or to collect claims prior to 
the ordering of the stay as meant in Article 376 
shall retain this right during the stay, provided 
this falls within the debtor’s ordinary course of 
business.  
2. The debtor may exercise the right described 
in Article 377(1) only if the interests of the 
third parties affected are adequately protected.  
3. If the requirement of Article 377(2) is no 
longer satisfied, the court shall revoke or limit 
the exercise of the right referred to in Article 
377(1) at the request of one or more affected 
third parties. Before taking its decision, the 
court shall offer the third parties affected, the 
debtor, the restructuring expert as meant in 
Article 371, if appointed, and the observer as 
meant in Article 380, if appointed, an 
opportunity to express their views in a manner 
and within a period determined by the court.90 
The Dutch Minister of Justice has explained that a 
debtor must be able to expend and dispose of 
stock, use business resources and collect claims 
against their customers so that their business can 
continue. He added:  
“This also applies to property or claims 
that are encumbered with third party 
rights. They might include stocks or 
company resources that are delivered 
subject to retention of title and claims that 
are encumbered with a security right. 
What is important is that the debtor may 
only exercise this right if the interests of 
the parties that derive rights in any way 
from the said property or claims are 
adequately protected (Article 377(2) and 
(3)). For example, by offering 
replacement security.”91 
 
90 English translation of the bill and the legislative 
explanatory notes by RESOR: url: 
https://www.resor.nl/files/WHOA_ENG.pdf/at_download/fil
e. Cf. AM Mennens, Het dwangakkoord buiten surseance en 
faillissement (Wolter Kluwer 2020) nr. 287-290. 
91 Memorie van Toelichting 23Previous suggestions to 
introduce such a right were not followed by the legislator. Cf. 
Art. 3.6.4 Voorontwerp Insolventiewet 2007; MJ van der AA, 
De afkoelingsperiode in faillissement (2007) 123-128. 
92 Memorie van Toelichting 63. ‘Artikel 377 ziet ook op de 
situatie waarin de schuldenaar een gebruiksrecht heeft gehad, 
maar dit recht hem kort (bijvoorbeeld twee weken) voor de 
afkondiging van de afkoelingsperiode wordt ontnomen. Zodra 
According to the legislative explanatory notes, 
article 377 also relates to a situation where the 
debtor has had a right of use of the collateral but 
was deprived of that right shortly (for example, 
two weeks) before the order of stay.92 As soon as 
the court orders the stay, the debtor can invoke 
Article 377 and reinstate their right of use. 
If the debtor disposes of encumbered assets, he 
needs to provide the secured creditors with 
adequate protection. The explanatory notes state: 
“Essentially, the latter condition implies 
the following. Where the debtor expends 
or disposes of property, the third party’s 
right to that property would typically also 
be extinguished. To ensure that the 
interests of secured creditors are not 
harmed by this, the debtor is required to 
provide the affected creditors with 
replacement security.”93 
If the debtor cannot offer adequate protection, the 
secured creditor can ask the court to end or limit 
the debtor’s right of use, as article 377 (3) 
provides. 
The Dutch Minister of Justice expressly 
mentioned replacement security as adequate 
protection. In many cases in which restructuring is 
required, however, the debtor is over-indebted and 
many of its assets are already encumbered in 
favour of other secured creditors. Various 
questions remain unanswered.94 For example, 
what will replacement security mean for a supplier 
with a retention of title? Will he be paid for 
deliveries prior to the stay and what will happen to 
the ‘old’ non-cash encumbered assets during the 
stay? As pointed out above, a creditor’s security 
right will not automatically extend to the 
de rechtbank de afkoelingsperiode heeft afgekondigd, kan de 
schuldenaar zich beroepen op artikel 377 en zorgen dat zijn 
gebruiksrecht herleeft.’ 
93 Memorie van Toelichting 63. ‘De laatste voorwaarde komt 
neer op het volgende. Als de schuldenaar de goederen 
verbruikt of vervreemdt, vervalt daarmee doorgaans ook het 
recht van de derde op die goederen. Om ervoor te zorgen dat 
zekerheidsgerechtigde schuldeisers hierdoor niet in hun 
belangen worden geschaad, zal de schuldenaar de betreffende 
schuldeisers vervangende zekerheid moet verschaffen.’ 
94 Cf. AM Mennens, Het dwangakkoord buiten surseance en 
faillissement (Wolter Kluwer 2020) nr. 287-290. 







receivable that replaces the asset if it has been sold 
by the debtor. 
When it comes to the interpretation of the 
Directive´s unfair prejudice and appropriate 
safeguards or the Dutch WHOA’s adequate 
protection, legislators and legal practitioners will 
probably look for more particularised guidance in 
UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency 
Law or the US Bankruptcy code.95 
 
4. The continued use and disposal of assets 
and adequate protection in UNCITRAL’s 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 
The continued use and disposal of encumbered 
assets in the ordinary course of business is not only 
consistent with the Creditor’s Bargain Theory, but 
also with recommendation 52 of the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (hereafter: 
the Guide). The Guide recognises the need to use 
or sell encumbered assets during insolvency 
proceedings.96 The disposal of third-party-owned 
assets in the ordinary course of business is, 
however, not recommended by the Guide. It only 
recommends a right of use of third-party-owned 
assets in the ordinary course of business.97  
Both the Dutch approach and the Guide’s 
approach progress from the notion that the 
continued use or disposal of assets charged with 
security interests in the ordinary course of business 
could benefit all creditors. However, the continued 
use and disposal of encumbered assets is only 
deemed justifiable if the secured creditors are 
adequately protected.  
The Guide remarks that secured creditors could be 
protected by receiving substitute equivalent 
security interests, such as a replacement security 
right over other assets or the proceeds of the sale 
of the encumbered asset or receiving payment of 
the full amount of the value of the assets that 
secure the secured claim either immediately or 
through an agreed payment plan.98 With regard to 
 
95 Cf. GD Hoekstra, De positie van de pandhouder in het 
faillissementsrecht (Bju 2007) 195-215. 
96 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, para 
74. 
97 Recommendation 54. 
98 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, para 
68. 
the use of third-party assets, the Guide states that 
the owner of the assets, such as a supplier who 
stipulated a retention of title, should be protected 
against diminution in the value of the asset.99 
Furthermore, the costs under the contract of 
continued performance of the contract and use of 
the asset will be paid as an administrative 
expense.100 Only if encumbered assets or assets 
subject to other interests are sold outside the 
ordinary course of business, does the Guide 
recommend that the priority of interests in the 
proceeds of sale of the asset is preserved.101 
The Guide distinguishes between two 
types of adequate protection: (1) the protection of 
the value of the encumbered asset and (2) the 
protection of the value of the secured portion of 
the claim. In the first approach, the secured 
creditor is protected against the diminution in 
value of the encumbered assets during a stay, if 
that value is less than the amount of the secured 
claim.102 The protection could entail additional or 
substitute assets or periodic cash payments 
corresponding to the amount of the diminution in 
value. If the value of the encumbered assets 
exceeds the value of the secured claim, the 
payment of interest could be considered during the 
period of the stay to compensate for delay imposed 
by the proceedings. 
The Guide’s second approach is the 
protection of the value of the secured portion of 
the claim. This means that the encumbered asset is 
valued immediately upon commencement and, 
based on that valuation, ‘the amount of the secured 
portion of the creditor’s claim is determined. This 
amount remains fixed throughout the proceedings 
and, upon distribution following liquidation, the 
secured creditor receives a first-priority claim to 
the extent of that amount. During the proceedings, 
the secured creditor could also receive the 
contractual rate of interest on the secured portion 
of the claim to compensate for delay imposed by 
the proceedings. This approach avoids some of the 
complexities associated with ongoing valuation of 
99 Recommendation 54. 
100 Recommendation 54. 
101 Recommendations 52 and 58. 
102 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, para 
64-65. 







the encumbered assets that may be required under 
the first approach noted above.’103 
The Guide and the Dutch WHOA clearly echo 
§ 361 (Adequate protection) of Chapter 11 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code, which permits 
reorganisation under the bankruptcy laws of the 
United States. § 361 states that adequate protection 
may be provided by making a cash payment or 
periodic cash payments to secured creditors (1), by 
providing additional or replacement security (2), 
or by granting other relief (3).  
Time will tell what Member States (and national 
judges) will consider unfair prejudice to secured 
creditors and if they will require appropriate 
safeguards or adequate protection for secured 
creditors affected by the stay. Whether protection 
is adequate, is directly linked to the valuation of 
the encumbered assets. In the United States, 
valuation of assets is often determined ‘through 
either litigation or bargaining in the shadow of 
litigation’.104 The Guide allows for parties to agree 
on the modalities of a valuation, such as the basis 
of the valuation (e.g., going concern value or 
liquidation value), the party undertaking the 
valuation, the moment of valuation, and the party 
bearing the costs of the valuation.105 National 
legislators could also confer a role on the courts or 
restructuring representative. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The way in which Member States address the 
deployment of encumbered assets during the 
Directive’s stay will have an impact on the 
effectiveness of the restructuring procedure. 
During the Directive’s stay, secured creditors 
cannot enforce their security rights and are at risk 
of depreciation and value fluctuation of the 
encumbered assets and the time value cost of 
delay. Secured creditors will want these risks 
mitigated by adequate protection. The Directive 
only requires Member States to provide that the 
judicial or administrative authorities get to lift a 
stay if creditors are unfairly prejudiced by it. It 
 
103 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, para 
69. 
104 L Arye Bebchuk and JM Fried, ‘Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy’ (2011) 114 Harvard Law Review 8, 2390. 
does not, however, make the protection of secured 
creditors during the stay compulsory. If the debtor 
is able to dispose of encumbered assets during the 
stay but the secured creditor gets nothing in return, 
there is no adequate protection. This increases the 
risk that secured creditors will strive to safeguard 
their interest by seeking to lift the stay and/or 
trying to terminate the continued use and disposal 
of encumbered assets in the debtor’s ordinary 
course of business.  
This in itself is not a new problem since it 
often occurs in Member States’ current formal 
insolvency procedures. For example, if secured 
creditors lose access to out-of-court enforcement 
of their security rights under national formal 
insolvency procedures they can also be 
incentivized to exercise their rights prior to 
insolvency. Member States are free to address this 
problem as they see fit in their national insolvency 
legislation, regardless of whether effective 
restructuring can be achieved. However, when it 
comes to addressing this problem in the 
Directive’s pre-insolvency procedure, Member 
States are required to put in place preventive 
restructuring procedures which comply with 
certain minimum principles of effectiveness.106  
The Directive itself ignores asset 
deployment by focussing on the effects of the stay 
on the enforcement of security rights. The impact 
of the Directive on secured creditors’ contractual 
powers (and obligations) under the security 
agreement is unclear, since the Directive does not 
clarify how the security agreement relates to the 
provisions on executory contracts. A security 
agreement usually contains more than just clauses 
on the (out-of-court) enforcement of the security 
rights. It often contains clauses that grant powers 
to the debtor or creditor, such as the provision that 
the debtor has power/permission to dispose of 
encumbered assets free of security rights in the 
debtor’s ordinary course of business. This is often 
accompanied by provisions on 
termination/revocation of this power/permission. 
As the Directive does not clarify whether and to 
what extent these powers are affected by the 
provisions on executory contracts, Member States 
105 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, para 
66-7. 
106 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 1 and 13. 







have leeway in applying the provisions on 
executory contracts to security agreements. 
The present Austrian restructuring 
procedure illustrates how a broad definition of 
executory contracts could prevent some secured 
creditors from exercising their contractual power 
under the security agreement. For example, 
contracts of sale with retention of title are treated 
as executory contracts and cannot be terminated 
because of unpaid deliveries prior to the opening 
of the procedure. This means that the debtor will 
still be able to dispose of encumbered assets in the 
ordinary course of business during the stay. If, 
however, no adequate protection is offered to the 
creditor, he may still be able to terminate the 
contract if its continuation leads to severe personal 
or economic damages to the creditor. The Belgian 
legislation approaches asset deployment in a 
different way by enabling creditors to revoke the 
permission given to the debtor to sell the assets 
free of security rights in their ordinary course of 
business. However, it reduces the incentive for 
secured creditors to do so. The secured creditor is 
protected against the continued disposal of 
encumbered assets during the stay, since the 
security right automatically passes into the 
receivable that replaces the asset. However, this 
protection is lost once the money is paid by the 
third party-buyer to the seller as the security right 
will only exist as long as the ‘proceeds’ are 
identifiable in the estate of the debtor. The 
proposed Dutch act on restructuring, the WHOA, 
bypasses secured creditors by providing for the 
continued use of encumbered property in the 
ordinary course of business, if the interests of the 
affected secured creditors are adequately 
protected. 
 
These national approaches illustrate how Member 
States could deal with asset deployment during the 
stay, regardless of whether or not the underlying 
contract or security agreement is executory. The 
bottom line is that Member States are required to 
introduce a pre-insolvency procedure that enables 
effective restructuring. This means that if asset 
deployment is problematic for effective 
restructuring in Member States’ formal insolvency 
procedures, Member States could be required to 
 
107 Preamble to the Restructuring Directive, para 32. 
provide a more effective solution to that problem 
in a pre-insolvency procedure. Article 5 of the 
Directive requires that the debtor remains in 
control of their assets and day-to-day operation of 
business. Member States must eliminate the 
secured creditor’s right to prevent the debtor from 
disposing of encumbered assets or the incentive 
for a secured creditor to exercise this right to 
ensure the continued deployment of encumbered 
assets during the stay. The best way to do this is to 
provide secured creditors with adequate 
protection. This is consistent with prevailing 
bankruptcy theory, international standards, and the 
aim of the Directive to enable the debtor to 
continue operating or at least to preserve the value 
of its estate during the negotiations.107 
 
